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A Critique of Meillassoux’s
Reflections on Mathematics
from the Perspective of
Bunge’s Philosophy
Martín Orensanz1
RÉSUMÉ — Quentin Meillassoux est l’un des principaux philosophes fran-
çais d’aujourd’hui. Son premier livre, Après la finitude. Essai sur la
nécessité de la contingence, publié pour la première fois en 2006 et
traduit en anglais en 2008, est déjà devenu un classique culte. Il com-
porte une préface de son ancien mentor, Alain Badiou. L’un des prin-
cipaux objectifs de Meillassoux est de réhabiliter la distinction entre
qualités premières et qualités secondes, typique des philosophies pré-
kantiennes. Plus précisément, il affirme que les mathématiques sont
capables de révéler les qualités premières de tout objet : « tous les
aspects de l’objet qui peuvent être formulés en termes mathé-
matiques peuvent être considérés de manière significative comme
des propriétés de l’objet en soi. » Ici, nous allons utiliser la philosophie
mathématique de Bunge pour remettre en question l’hypothèse pré-
cédente.
ABSTRACT — Quentin Meillassoux is one of the leading French philoso-
phers of today. His first book, Après la finitude: Essai sur la nécessité de
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Argentina (CONICET). Together with Guillermo Denegri, he is working on the philosophical,
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la contingence, first published in 2006 and translated into English in
2008, has already become a cult classic. It features a préface by his
former mentor, Alain Badiou. One of Meillassoux’s main goals is to re-
habilitate the distinction between primary and secondary qualities,
typical of pre-Kantian philosophies. Specifically, he claims that math-
ematics is capable of disclosing the primary qualities of any object:
“all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathemat-
ical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object
in itself.” (Meillassoux, 2008: 3, emphasis removed). Here we will use
Bunge’s philosophy of mathematics in order to challenge the preced-
ing assumption.
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1 MEILLASSOUX'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS IN AFTER
FINITUDE
First, it will be necessary to indicate that Meillassoux rejects a thesis
which he calls “Pythagorean”. Whether or not this has anything to do with
what Pythagoras actually upheld, Meillassoux uses that term to refer to
the thesis that mathematical statements, such as formulas and equations,
are as real as any object in the Universe. Contrary to this point of view,
he claims that mathematical statements are not real but ideal instead.
This is found in his discussion of the accretion of the Earth, where he says:
Consequently, our Cartesian physicist will maintain that those statements
about the accretion of the earth which can be mathematically formulated
designate actual properties of the event in question (such as its date, its
duration, its extension), even when there was no observer present to ex-
perience it directly. In doing so, our physicist is defending a Cartesian thesis
about matter, but not, it is important to note, a Pythagorean one: the claim
is not that the being of accretion is inherently mathematical—that the
numbers or equations deployed in the ancestral statements exist in them-
selves. For it would then be necessary to say that accretion is a reality every
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bit as ideal as that of number or of an equation. Generally speaking, state-
ments are ideal insofar as their reality is one of signification. But their ref-
erents, for their part, are not necessarily ideal (the cat is on the mat is real,
even though the statement “the cat is on the mat” is ideal). In this particular
instance, it would be necessary to specify: the referents of the statements
about dates, volumes, etc., existed 4.56 billion years ago as described by
these statements—but not these statements themselves, which are con-
temporaneous with us2.
Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity in the preceding distinction be-
tween statements and their referents. This was noted by Graham Harman
in his book on Meillassoux’s philosophy. Harman explains this ambiguity
in the following way:
Meillassoux says that the Cartesian position towards physics (and he takes
the side of Descartes on most issues) must be distinguished from the Py-
thagorean position that the mathematical is reality itself. The Cartesian po-
sition is supposedly different in so far as it is the referent of equations which
has existence independent of humans, not the equations themselves. This
sounds plausible enough in Descartes’s case, given the explicit role in his
philosophy of physical substance. But assuming that Meillassoux means to
take an anti-Pythagorean line in this passage (which he probably does), it
remains unclear what his residual “referent” would be beyond the mathe-
matical other than the “dead matter” that we have already found lacking3.
Meillassoux’s philosophy of mathematics is ambiguous on this point be-
cause, on the one hand, he claims that mathematical statements can dis-
close the primary qualities of an object, such as its length, height, figure,
and so forth. These primary qualities are properties that the object has in
itself, independently of the presence of human beings. So, for example, an
object that has a triangular shape has a mathematical property inde-
pendently of the presence of human beings. But on the other hand, the
rejection of the “Pythagorean” thesis entails that the object in question
cannot have a triangular shape by itself, since the concept of “triangle” is
a term used in the statements of geometry, understood as a branch of
mathematics. Having indicated this ambiguity, we will assume that
2 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 2008 [2006], p. 12.
3 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 2015 [2011], p. 207.
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Meillassoux’s view on this issue is that objects in themselves have primary
qualities, which are inherently mathematical. These properties are real,
while the mathematical statements that disclose them are ideal. Such a
view is at odds with Bunge’s philosophy of mathematics. Consider the fol-
lowing statement:
There is no reason to expect that pure mathematics is capable of disclosing,
without further ado, the structure of reality4.
Why not? Because pure mathematics, by itself, only deals with constructs.
In order to study reality, we need empirical science; pure mathematics
alone is insufficient for that task. To be sure, Meillassoux is aware of this:
“For what is at stake here”, he says, “is the nature of scientific discourse,
and more particularly of what characterizes this discourse, i.e. its mathe-
matical form5.” And, later on, he says, “it is the discourse of empirical sci-
ence as such that we are attempting to understand and to legitimate6”.
Thus, Meillassoux recognizes that there is a difference between pure
mathematics and empirical science. Furthermore, he believes that one of
the salient features of empirical science is that it relies heavily on mathe-
matics; not entirely, but to a large extent. Of course, Bunge does not have
any qualms with this. The decisive issue here is: What do the statements
of empirical science refer to, especially those that rely heavily on mathe-
matics? Meillassoux seems to believe, in agreement with Descartes and
Locke, that properties such as length, height, figure, among others, are
not merely technical terms of the vocabulary of geometry, but real proper-
ties that can be found in external objects instead. We will see that this is
not the case according to Bunge.
But before we do so, and in order to understand Bunge’s mathematical
fictionalism, it will be necessary to take a quick look at the history of non-
Euclidean geometries, and the consequences that their development had
for philosophy.
4 Bunge, Ontology I : The Furniture of the World, 1977, p. 150.
5 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 2015 [2011], p. 26.
6 Ibid., p. 28.
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2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF NON-EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRIES
In the fourth chapter of After Finitude, Meillassoux makes some scarce
comments on the history of mathematics7; specifically, he refers to the de-
velopment of non-Euclidean geometries during the nineteenth century,
stating that “we are all familiar” with their history, and then he summa-
rizes Lobachevsky’s work. Although Meillassoux’s target audience may be
familiar with that history, it seems to us that it must be recounted here.
But before we present that history, it will be convenient to note that
according to Meillassoux, philosophers have recently become modest, and
even prudent, when discussing scientific issues8. It seems to us that this
has been especially true after the Sokal affair. Unlike previous genera-
tions, today’s continental philosophers have learned to be cautious about
topics such as non-Euclidean geometries, Einstein’s theories of special and
general relativity, quantum physics and Gödel’s theorems, among others.
This was never a problem for analytic philosophers. For example, Ern-
est Nagel and James Newman wrote a book on Gödel’s proof9, and Thomas
Kuhn wrote a book on quantum physics10. None of these authors have been
criticized by Alan Sokal or Jean Bricmont for misusing scientific concepts.
Kuhn has been criticized by Sokal and Bricmont in Fashionable Nonsense
for fostering philosophical relativism, but not for misunderstanding phys-
ics11. The point is that philosophers may be knowledgeable enough to write
on topics such as Gödel’s work and quantum physics without falling into
charlatanry. That some philosophers do fall into charlatanry when dis-
cussing these topics does not mean that all of them do so. Of course, nei-
ther Sokal nor Bricmont claim the contrary. They specifically criticize a
group of thinkers, those that they regard as postmodern intellectuals. But
to step into that discussion exceeds the purposes of this article. We have
only advanced these remarks in order to clearly state that we are fully




9 Nagel & Newman, Gödel’s Proof, 1958.
10 Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912, 1987.
11 Sokal & Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense, 1998 [1997], p. 51.
Martín Orensanz ï A Critique of Meillassoux’s Reflections on Mathematics ï6
Mεtascience | No. 1 | 2020 | Mario Bunge : Thinker of Materiality
Thus, our presentation of the history of non-Euclidean geometries will
follow Meillassoux’s remark about modesty and prudence. In order to do
so, we will use a well-known Argentine textbook on the philosophy of
mathematics by Gregorio Klimovsky and Guillermo Boido, Las desventu-
ras del conocimiento matemático (“The Misadventures of Mathematical
Knowledge”)12. Klimovsky was a mathematician and philosopher of sci-
ence who introduced set theory in Argentina. Boido was a physicist and
historian of science, who wrote a popular history book on Galileo. A more
detailed presentation of non-Euclidean geometries and their history can
be found in Richard Trudeau’s book, The non-Euclidean revolution13. Sev-
eral quotes and definitions by philosophers and mathematicians of the
past can also be found in Trudeau’s book.
It will be necessary to begin by considering Euclid’s Elements, which
has certain similarities with Aristotle’s way of conceiving axioms and the-
orems. For Aristotle, axioms are self-evident principles, which are unde-
niably true. From them, theorems can be deduced, and which are also un-
deniably true. Thus, he says in the Posterior Analytics:
That which is an indispensable antecedent to the acquisition of any
knowledge I call an Axiom; for there are some principles of this kind, and
“axiom” is the name generally applied to them14.
And later on, he highlights the self-evidence that characterizes axioms,
when he says:
There are three elements in demonstrations: (1) the conclusion which is
demonstrated, i. e., an essential attribute of some genus; (2) axioms or self-
evident principles from which the proof proceeds; (3) the genus in question
whose properties, i. e. essential attributes, are set forth by the demonstra-
tions15.
Euclid’s postulates apparently were more or less similar to Aristotle’s ax-
ioms; that is, they were true statements which do not need to be demon-
strated. Klimovsky and Boido say the following:
12 Klimovsky & Boido, Las desventuras del conocimiento matemático, 2005.
13 Trudeau, The Non-Euclidean Revolution, 2008 [1987].
14 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 1901, p. 6.
15 Ibid., p. 20.
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The statements that Euclid calls postulates are assumptions that we must
accept without demonstration and that concern geometry itself. They are
roughly equivalent to Aristotle’s axioms, although our geometer does not
make any philosophical considerations about their evidence and merely
asks the reader to accept them16.
This being so, let us examine the history of non-Euclidean geometries,
which has its roots in the attempts to prove Euclid’s fifth postulate. These
roots go far back to Antiquity. Philosophers like Posidonius and Geminus
had the suspicion that the fifth postulate was not really a postulate, but a
theorem. There were more or less solid reasons for this doubt. First of all,
the grammatical expression of the fifth postulate is much more compli-
cated and extensive than the other four. In its original formulation, it says
nothing about parallels. Let us cite Euclid’s five postulates, in order to see
how “strange” the fifth looks, at least from a grammatical point of view:
Let the following be postulated:
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line.
3. To describe a circle with any center and distance.
4. That all right angles are equal to one another.
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles
on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if pro-
duced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the
two right angles17.
The fifth postulate looked grammatically “strange” when one compared it
to the other four. But this was not the only problem. If it was, then there
would not be any other reasons, other than grammar, to suspect that this
was a theorem. In other words, it would have been a postulate which was
poorly written, but a postulate nonetheless. There was another source of
doubt, more problematic than grammar. It was the fact that the fifth pos-
tulate was explicitly used only once in Euclid’s book. On the other hand,
the first, second, third and fourth postulates are frequently used through-
out the book, in order to deduce many different theorems. It seemed
16 Klimovsky & Boido, Las desventuras del conocimiento matemático, 2005, p. 78‑79.
17 Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, 1908, p. 154‑55.
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suspicious that there was a postulate whose only role was to deduce one
specific theorem. In the words of Klimovsky and Boido:
It is striking that Euclid has placed among the postulates of his system one
that is used explicitly only once, as if some aversion on the part of the au-
thor of the Elements lies behind it. We would say that everything happens
as if in a certain religion we found a god of rain, another of fire, a third of
the earth and a fourth of the sea, but also a god whose specific purpose is
to cure a particular cold to a certain king. A divinity destined exclusively to
that seems a bit excessive18.
This is why philosophers like Posidonius and Geminus suspected that the
fifth “postulate” was a theorem, and they attempted to prove this. Even
more so, they succeeded. They really did deduce the fifth postulate, there-
fore proving that it was a theorem. But there was a catch: they introduced
an additional postulate in order to do this. Thus, Posidonius, whose work
we know from the commentaries of Proclus, apparently proposed the fol-
lowing additional postulate:
Parallel straight lines are equidistant19.
Now this is much more concise and elegant than Euclid’s formulation of
the fifth postulate, as far as grammar is concerned. And with it, one can
deduce Euclid’s fifth “postulate” as a theorem. The problem is that the
postulate that Posidonius introduces is actually equivalent to Euclid’s.
They say the same thing, even if this is not immediately evident. But it
can be proved. If one takes the first four postulates of Euclid’s Elements,
together with the postulate that Posidonius introduces, it is possible to
deduce, as a theorem, Euclid’s fifth postulate. But the converse is also
true. If one takes all of Euclid’s postulates, then Posidonius’ “postulate”
can be deduced as a theorem. So Posidonius did not really prove that Eu-
clid’s fifth postulate was a theorem. In order to do so, he would have had
to either deduce it using only the first four postulates of the Elements, or
he would have had to introduce a new postulate which would not be logi-
cally equivalent to Euclid’s fifth. He believed that he had succeeded in
pursuing this second option, but later it was shown that this had not been
18 Klimovsky & Boido, Las desventuras del conocimiento matemático, 2005, p. 90.
19 Trudeau, The Non-Euclidean Revolution, 2008 [1987], p. 128.
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the case. The other philosopher of that time, Geminus, had a similar ex-
perience.
At the beginning of the Middle Ages, Proclus summarized most of the
earlier attempts at proving the fifth postulate. All of them had the same
thing in common: they introduced an additional postulate, which was
shown later to be equivalent to Euclid’s fifth. Proclus himself attempted
an additional proof. He did so by surreptitiously introducing a statement
that is equivalent to Euclid’s fifth postulate.
This kept going on and on during the Middle Ages and later during the
Renaissance as well. At the same time, mathematics in general had been
marching forward, especially in the works of Copernicus, Galileo, and
later in Descartes. Mathematics, says Meillassoux, began to describe a
“glacial world”, one that was independent of human experience, and even
of human existence:
It is this glacial world that is revealed to the moderns, a world in which
there is no longer any up or down, centre or periphery, nor anything else
that might make of it a world designed for humans. For the first time, the
world manifests itself as capable of subsisting without any of those aspects
that constitute its concreteness for us20.
Yet, the map of this glacial landscape would remain incomplete until Eu-
clid’s fifth postulate could finally be proven. It seemed like an almost im-
possible task, since there had been numerous attempts during the past
centuries, and all of them had failed. By the 18th century, the situation
was scandalous. While Kant claimed in a footnote to the Critique of Pure
Reason that the lack of a solid proof for the existence of external things
was “the scandal of philosophy” 21, D’Alembert claimed in the Essays on
the Elements of Philosophy that the problem of the parallel postulate was
“the scandal of geometry”22. Euclid’s fifth postulate came to be known as
“the parallel postulate” because it could be written in a more elegant and
concise way by using the notion of parallels. So, for example, it became
customary to use the following equivalent formulation, which was popu-
larized by John Playfair at the end of the 18th century:
20 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 2008 [2006], p. 115.
21 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2000 [1781–1787], p. 121.
22 Le Lionnais, « Beauty in Mathematics », 2004, p. 133.
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Through a given point not on a given straight line, and not on that straight
line produced, no more than one parallel straight line can be drawn23.
According to Klimovsky and Boido, during the early decades of the 19th
century, a small group of mathematicians:
[…] had the firm suspicion that the postulate of the parallels is unprovable
from the previous four and that it is possible to obtain new conclusions,
without finding any contradiction, admitting these four postulates and the
negation of the fifth24.
Among this group was Gauss. He developed a new geometry, a non-Eu-
clidean one, but he did not publish his results immediately. Gauss did not
publish his manuscripts because he feared that his colleagues would con-
sider his work to be “the result of an insane lucubration, worthy of an
eccentric”25.
However, Gauss received a book from an old friend of his, a mathema-
tician called Wolfgang Bolyai. It was a two-volume work on geometry. This
treatise included an appendix written by his son, Johann Bolyai. In this
appendix, Johann Bolyai had developed a non-Euclidean geometry by ac-
cepting Euclid’s first four postulates and this additional one: “from a point
exterior to a strait line there is more than one parallel that passes through
that point”. Previously, Johann had told his father that he had “created a
universe out of nothing”. When Gauss received this book, he wrote a letter
to Wolfgang. He praised Johann’s work, and felt relieved that other people
had reached similar results by negating Euclid’s fifth postulate. He now
had more confidence in the idea that he was not a lone eccentric, but a
serious researcher who, despite having produced a geometry which
seemed “strange”, had no logical errors. Gauss decided to encourage other
mathematicians to investigate these possibilities. Yet the atmosphere of
the time was rather uncertain, many mathematicians still felt that they
could be making fools of themselves if they insisted too much on this issue.
Johann Bolyai decided to stop publishing, in part due to the reason just
mentioned, and in part because he felt that Gauss could rob him of his
23 Trudeau, The Non-Euclidean Revolution, 2008 [1987], p. 128.
24 Klimovsky & Boido, Las desventuras del conocimiento matemático, 2005, p. 94.
25 Ibid., p. 95.
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merits if the community of mathematicians were to fully accept the idea
that it was possible, and legitimate, to develop non-Euclidean geometries.
Johann Bolyai was not entirely wrong in his suspicions. He was wrong
to suppose that Gauss would try to steal his merit. But he was not wrong
in supposing that the community of mathematicians would not accept the
possibility of non-Euclidean geometries. This last point was to be corrobo-
rated when a third figure emerged on the scene, Nikolai Lobachevksy. He
had developed a non-Euclidean geometry very similar to that of Bolyai,
and he presented it in conferences and in publications. Lobachevsky had
been urged by a friend of Gauss to publish these results; apparently be-
cause Lobachevsky himself felt rather uneasy about it, just like Gauss and
Bolyai had felt. None of them were wrong on this point, because when the
community of mathematicians started to pay attention to what they had
written, they were accused of fabricating “caricatures of geometry” and
even “morbid manifestations of geometry”26.
What were the characteristics of these early non-Euclidean geome-
tries? Why did they seem so “repugnant”, or hard to accept? Neither
Gauss, Bolyai nor Lobachevsky reached any contradictions by denying Eu-
clid’s fifth postulate. Instead, what they obtained was a series of “weird”
theorems, which nonetheless were perfectly valid from a logical point of
view. They were so “weird” that they defied intuition, and even common
sense. For example, “the sum of the angles of a triangle is less than 180
degrees”. Or they included statements like this one: “from a point exterior
to a straight line, an infinite number of parallels pass through that point”.
As if this was not enough, another mathematician, Bernhard Riemann,
developed a non-Euclidean geometry which claimed that “from a point ex-
terior to a straight line, no parallels pass through that point”. While
Gauss, Bolyai and Lobachevsky developed different versions of what was
later to be called “hyperbolic geometry”, Riemann developed what would
later be known as “elliptic geometry”. It was Felix Klein who introduced
these terms to describe the new geometries developed by his colleagues.
When the community of mathematicians began to pay sufficient atten-
tion to these new geometries, their initial rejection gave way to a more
sophisticated way of resisting them. Instead of using terms like
26 Ibid., p. 94‑96.
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“caricature” and “morbid” to describe these geometries, the idea that be-
gan to gain acceptance was that these new geometries were perfectly log-
ical, but that, unlike Euclid’s, they did not refer to anything in the real
world. In other words, it was claimed that Euclid’s geometry is the only
one that correctly describes physical space, while these other geometries
do not describe anything. They were, in a sense, “imaginary”, while Eu-
clid’s, on the other hand, was real.
Since that was supposedly the case, this gave way to the idea that those
mathematicians who were working on non-Euclidean geometries were
more or less wasting their time. Or, at best, they were simply entertaining
themselves with a “game”, as if they were inventing new rules for playing
chess. Of course, one can invent any alternative rules for chess and have
fun playing with those rules, no matter how bizarre they may be. But if
one wanted to do serious research as a mathematician, then the efforts
had to be made in the only geometry which was not purely imaginary, the
only one that can describe physical space, that is, Euclidean geometry.
David Hilbert did not share the preceding opinion. For him, the inven-
tion of non-Euclidean geometries was not a waste of time. On the contrary,
he claimed that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the develop-
ment of a purely formal system, on the one hand, and the task of finding
applications for that formal system, on the other. In other words, one must
distinguish between “pure” and “applied” mathematics. That a mathemat-
ical system, such as a non-Euclidean geometry, has no immediate appli-
cations in the real world, does not mean that there are no applications in
principle. Because it could be the case that there are such applications,
but that we have simply not found them yet. Thus, it is hastily and inad-
visable to condemn research in pure mathematics just because it has no
immediate applications.
Hilbert maintained that pure mathematics was the study of formal sys-
tems, and that the only thing that matters in these formal systems is their
syntax. Applied mathematics, on the other hand, is the task of finding
semantic interpretations of those formal systems. It is only at this point
that semantics enters the scene; in purely formal systems, all that matters
are their syntax. This distinction between pure and applied mathematics
began to gain acceptance within the community of mathematicians, but
there was still some reticence to the idea that non-Euclidean geometries
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could have a physical interpretation. They were too weird; their most basic
statements went against common sense. The tide finally turned when Ein-
stein described physical space in 1916 using an interpretation of Rie-
mann’s elliptic geometry. This showed that non-Euclidean geometries
could indeed have a relation to the real world, and that they could be used
to describe physical space just as good, if not better, than Euclidean geom-
etry.
Profound consequences ensued. Some of them were even quite disturb-
ing. First of all, intuition and common sense were no longer a guarantee
of what kind of mathematical research qualifies as “legitimate”. In other
words, one cannot dismiss a work of mathematics simply because it runs
contrary to intuition and common sense. Second, it was no longer clear
that Euclidean geometry was the only “true” or “real” geometry, and it was
not clear that there could even be such a thing, Euclidean or not. Instead,
Hilbert’s distinction between pure and applied mathematics became the
new cornerstone of mathematical research. All purely formal systems are
equally legitimate; Euclid’s geometry is not “better” or “worse” than non-
Euclidean geometries. As long as they are treated in a purely formal way,
all of them are on an equal footing. Regarding Hilbert’s work, Klimovsky
and Boido say the following:
Hilbert himself claimed that, while we are somehow obliged to use words
from everyday language to speak in (or within) a formal axiomatic system,
instead of “point”, “line”, and “plane” we could well use “table”, “chair”
and “beer glass” without altering in the least the system itself: “point” or
“table”, here, are mere empty labels without any meaning27.
Shocking, isn’t it? At least it was shocking to those mathematicians that
still adhered to the Aristotelian notion that axioms must be “true” and
“self-evident”. What Hilbert showed was that an axiom does not neces-
sarily have to be “true” or “self-evident” in the Aristotelian sense. Rather,
it is a meaningless expression, composed of meaningless signs, which is
arbitrarily formulated by the mathematician, in order to see what can be
deduced from it. The theorems, which are deduced from the axioms, are
no longer “true” either, as Aristotle thought. Instead, they are meaning-
less expressions, composed of meaningless signs, which are derived from
27 Ibid., p. 106.
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the axioms simply by following a set of accepted, arbitrary rules. In this
sense, a formal axiomatic system can be compared to a game of chess:
Actually, such a structure really looks like a logical game with some resem-
blance to chess. In chess we do not know exactly what we are referring to
with the pieces (what we do know is how to move them), and no one in
their right mind will believe that they are executing monarchical politics be-
cause they move the king, the queen and their pawns. Calling the pieces
“king”, “bishop” or “tower” is a tribute to tradition; in the same way, in a
non-Euclidean geometry the words “point”, “line”, “plane”, etc., have no
meaning. Such a methodology is known as formal axiomatic method, or
simply axiomatic method, and the game we have described in particular is
an example of what is called a formal axiomatic system28.
And later on, they say:
And if one were to ask here, from a purely theoretical, non-historical or
practical point of view, which one of these is the legitimate chess, the an-
swer would be: they are all equally legitimate, once it is accepted, for each
of them, their corresponding pieces, initial positions, rules, etc. The same
applies to axiomatic systems. From a purely logical perspective, we can un-
derstand Euclid’s geometry as a formal axiomatic system, since it has its
vocabulary, the categories of that vocabulary, and it has its starting points,
the axioms, and what is deduced from them, the theorems. Both the Eu-
clidean geometry and the non-Euclidean geometries would be, on an equal
level, formal axiomatic systems, that is, “games” that, as with the different
variants of chess that we have mentioned, would have to be considered, all
of them, perfectly legitimate29.
Having said this, we are ready to examine Bunge’s philosophy of mathe-
matics, which draws upon the philosophical consequences of the history of
non-Euclidean geometries.
3 BUNGE’S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
We saw that for Meillassoux, mathematical statements are ideal, but their
referents are not. We also saw that Harman noticed an ambiguity in this
28 Ibid., p. 104.
29 Ibid., p. 115.
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seemingly unproblematic position. In Bunge’s work, we find a solution to
this ambiguity. He unequivocally states that numbers are not found in the
Universe among objects such as rocks, trees and mountains. Numbers, ac-
cording to him, are brain processes:
Although thinking of the number 3 is a brain process, hence one located in
space-time, the number 3 is nowhere because it is a fiction existing by con-
vention or fiat, and this pretense does not include the property of spatio-
temporality. What holds for the number 3 holds for every other idea—con-
cept, proposition, or theory. In every case we abstract from the
neurophysiological properties of the concrete ideation process and come
up with a construct that, by convention, has only conceptual or ideal prop-
erties30.
According to Bunge, the number 3 is a fiction, and so is every other math-
ematical entity. There is more to be said, because not only does he consider
mathematical entities to be fictional, he says that every concept, proposi-
tion and theory are fictional as well. He calls these “constructs”, and they
include even the most complex scientific theories. So, for instance, a sci-
entific theory about gravity is not gravity itself. For one thing, gravity is
a fundamental force of nature, while a theory about gravity is not: it is a
brain process. And brain processes are not fundamental forces of nature.
So far, this is in agreement with Meillassoux’s distinction between state-
ments and their referents. But it seems that Meillassoux would be inclined
to believe that an iron sphere, for example, is spherical in itself. It would
be a sphere even if there was no one to look at it, since its spherical shape
is understood here as a primary quality. Bunge would disagree:
Concrete objects (things) have no intrinsic conceptual properties, in partic-
ular no mathematical features. This last statement goes against the grain
of objective idealism, from Plato through Hegel to Husserl, according to
which all objects, in particular material things, have ideal features such as
shape and number. What is true is that some of our ideas about the world,
when detached from their factual reference, can be dealt with by mathe-
matics. (For example, by analysis and abstraction we can extract the con-
structs “two” and “sphere” from the proposition “That iron sphere is com-
posed of two halves”.) In particular, mathematics helps us to study the
30 Bunge, Ontology II : A World of Systems, 1979, p. 146.
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(mathematical) form of substantial properties. In short, not the world but
some of our ideas about the world are mathematical31.
Material things, therefore, do not have shapes, at least strictly speaking.
We can, of course, talk about material things as if they had shapes, for
example when we say that a certain iron object is spherical. But that ob-
ject, in itself, is not spherical. This may seem hard to accept. Jean-Pierre
Marquis, in his appraisal of Bunge’s philosophy of mathematics, expresses
his concern regarding the clarity of this point, and offers some comments
on Bunge’s example of the iron sphere:
I must admit that this is not entirely clear to me. Needless to say, the iron
sphere is not, strictly speaking, a sphere in the mathematical sense. The
sensory impression of the sphere presumably gives us an approximation of
what a sphere in the strict sense would look like. One could perhaps say
that we treat the iron sphere as if it were a sphere. But in order to do this,
we already need to have the mathematical concept of sphere. The mathe-
matical concept of sphere is not in the iron sphere. The concept of sphere
is given in a certain language, be it geometric, analytic or algebraic, thus in
a certain context. It is, in Bunge’s terminology, a construct32.
In order to clarify Bunge’s example of the iron sphere, it will be useful to
remember what happened to the concept of triangles during the develop-
ment of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth century. In Euclidean
geometry, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to 180 degrees. For
millennia, this seemed to be an absolute truth. However, in some non-
Euclidean geometries it is possible to prove, without contradiction, that
the sum of the angles of a triangle is greater than 180 degrees; this is the
case of elliptic geometry. In others, such as hyperbolic geometry, the sum
of the angles of a triangle can be less than 180 degrees. One cannot say
that the triangles of Euclidean geometry are the “real” triangles and that
the triangles of non-Euclidean geometries are “not real”. What holds for
triangles also holds, in general, for all other shapes: spheres, squares, rec-
tangles, and so forth: there is no reason to believe that there is such a
thing as a “real” sphere as characterized by this or that geometry, as op-
posed to other “non-real” spheres characterized by other geometries. The
31 Bunge, Ontology I : The Furniture of the World, 1977, p. 118.
32 Marquis, « Mario Bunge’s Philosophy of Mathematics », 2012, p. 1574.
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preceding point can be clarified further by considering some of Bunge’s
comments on cultural objects:
I submit that the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for all cultural objects.
Thus, a sculpture that nobody looks at is just a chunk of matter—and so is
a philosophical treatise that nobody reads. There is no immortality in cul-
tural creations just because they can be externalized (“embodied”) and cat-
alogued33.
Initially, one could argue that a certain sculpture is a chunk of matter that
has a specific shape. But, just like the property of “being spherical” is not
a primary quality of an iron sphere, neither is “having a specific shape” in
the case of a sculpture that no one is looking at. Suppose we are consider-
ing a sculpture of a horse, or of Pegasus. The sculpture itself, without ob-
servers, would not look like a horse or Pegasus, because there would not
be anyone looking at it. If this is so, then it would not only apply to cultural
objects, but to natural ones as well. A waterfall would not look like a wa-
terfall when nobody is looking at it, the Moon would not look round or
spherical, on the contrary, both of them would just be chunks of matter,
without any visual appearance.
Bunge traces a distinction between attributes and properties. Attrib-
utes, according to him, are characteristics that we ascribe to things, but
the things in question, by themselves, do not have those attributes. Prop-
erties, on the contrary, do belong to things in themselves, independently
of human existence. Attributes are constructs, while properties are real.
Thus, when we say that a sculpture looks like a horse, this is something
that we are attributing to a chunk of matter. When we say that the sculp-
ture in question is made of iron, this is a property of that chunk of matter
itself. Iron has properties that are independent of our scientific hypothesis
and theories, although we use the latter in order to understand the former.
In this sense, “spherical” or “having a spherical shape” is not a property,
it is an attribute. Attributes can be mathematical, but not properties.
Whatever properties the object itself has, these are never mathematical.
33 Bunge, Ontology II : A World of Systems, 1979, p. 168‑70.
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the most prominent features of French philosophy in the continen-
tal tradition is, from a historical perspective, its increasing association
with mathematics. It was a prominent topic in the works of Gilles Deleuze,
and even more so in those of Alain Badiou. Quentin Meillassoux’s work is
in line with that tradition, and our wager is that it could greatly benefit
from Bunge’s philosophy of mathematics. The rationale for this is that
Bunge’s approach provides an unequivocal solution to the ambiguity that
Harman had recognized in Meillassoux’s discussion of the “Pythagorean”
thesis. Although Bunge advances some ideas which may seem difficult to
accept, such as the idea that objects in themselves do not have geometric
shapes, he nevertheless also provides reasons for doubting Meillassoux’s
claim that any property which can be mathematized can be construed as
a primary quality. Numbers, algebraic structures, and other mathemati-
cal entities are not real objects nor properties of real objects, but useful
fictions instead. They are brain processes, and by convention we feign that
they have autonomous existence.
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